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The article aims to analyze and explain the recent developments and challen-
ges regarding the jurisdictional immunity of  international organizations in 
labour disputes, both by international and national courts, concluding with 
remarks on the experience of  the Colombian case law in the matter. The 
article uses both case-law review and comparative law methodologies to first 
explain the main differences between diplomatic immunity and the immu-
nity of  international organizations regarding labour disputes, then, it descri-
bes the current legal trends regarding the applicable law to labour relations 
between international organizations and individuals, and the challenges to 
the immunity of  the organization when disputes arise. The article develops 
the modern trend of  requiring the organization to activate internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms to uphold its immunity before national courts. The 
article argues that there is an incomplete reception of  the principles go-
verning the immunity of  international organizations by recent Colombian 
case law and that frequently, constitutional judges confuse the sources that 
regulate diplomatic immunity with the sources that regulate the immunity 
of  international organizations. The article concludes that although interna-
tional case law over the past decade widely recognizes functional immunity 
and jurisdictional immunity as the governing law in  international organiza-
tions, it is still a controversial topic that has demanded fast developments 
regarding the applicable law, the differences with diplomatic immunity as 
understood by local authorities (expanding on the example of  Colombia) 
and the design of  innovative dispute resolution mechanisms within interna-
tional organizations.
Keywords: Immunity of  international organizations; Diplomatic immuni-
ty; Host State; national officials; functional immunity. labour disputes.
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O artigo tem como objetivo analisar e explicar os desen-
volvimentos e desafios recentes em relação à imunidade 
jurisdicional das organizações internacionais em confli-
tos trabalhistas, tanto por tribunais internacionais como 
nacionais, finalizando com observações sobre a expe-
riência da jurisprudência colombiana no assunto. O ar-
tigo usa tanto a revisão da jurisprudência quanto as me-
todologias de direito comparado para primeiro explicar 
as principais diferenças entre a imunidade diplomática e 
a imunidade das organizações internacionais em relação 
a disputas trabalhistas; em seguida, descreve as tendên-
cias atuais em relação ao direito aplicável às relações de 
trabalho entre organizações internacionais e indivíduos 
e os desafios à imunidade da organização quando sur-
gem controvérsias. O artigo explora a tendência mo-
derna de exigir que a organização ative mecanismos 
internos de solução de controvérsias para manter sua 
imunidade perante os tribunais nacionais e, por fim, 
o artigo estuda a recepção incompleta dos princípios 
que regem a imunidade das organizações internacionais 
pela recente jurisprudência colombiana. O artigo con-
clui que, embora a imunidade funcional e a imunidade 
jurisdicional sejam amplamente reconhecidas como o 
direito que rege as organizações internacionais na juri-
sprudência internacional da última década, ainda é um 
tema polêmico que exigiu rápido desenvolvimento em 
relação ao direito aplicável aplicável, as diferenças com 
imunidade diplomática compreendida pelas autoridades 
locais (ampliando o exemplo da Colômbia) e o desenho 
de mecanismos inovadores de resolução de controvér-
sias nas organizações internacionais.
Palavras-chave: Imunidade de organizações interna-
cionais; Imunidade diplomática; Estado anfitrião; Fun-
cionários nacionais; Imunidade funcional; Disputas tra-
balhistas
1 Introduction
The present article seeks to explain the recent de-
velopments and challenges regarding the jurisdictional 
immunity of  international organizations in labour dis-
putes, both by international and national courts, con-
cluding with remarks concerning the experience of  Co-
lombian case law in the matter. 
The starting point for this analysis, is defining the 
scope of  the conventional nature1 and scope of  the im-
munity of  international organizations and its differen-
ces with diplomatic immunity, along with the different 
nature of  their exemptions and waivers. Furthermore, 
the article defends the non-applicability of  the distinc-
tion between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis to in-
ternational organizations as a defense to their immunity 
in labour disputes. The methodology uses comparative 
case law of  both international and national tribunals 
and the article studies the principal differences between 
diplomatic immunity and functional immunity of  in-
ternational organizations in their labour relations with 
foreign and national citizens from the host State, arising 
from international practice.
To fully comprehend the current challenges2 that in-
ternational organizations face with the courts of  their 
host States and their employees, the article studies the 
legal nature of  labour relations between international 
organizations and their staff, its applicable law, the dis-
pute resolution mechanisms to which they are subjected 
and the grounds for upholding or waiving immunity in 
those situations, the article also analyzes modern exam-
ples of  the Staff  Regulations, the Constitutive Trea-
ties and the available case law both from international 
courts and human rights court that have studied the is-
sue, concluding with a review of  the current standards 
in the matter.
Although the article reviews international case law 
from several courts and national case law from different 
States in the matter, the article extends its remarks on 
the Colombian case law regarding immunities of  inter-
national organizations in labour disputes, a very particu-
lar case of  judicial misapplication3 where national jud-
1 An historical approach to the nature of  international organiza-
tions is necessary to complement the legal study of  their conven-
tional, treaty-based nature, for a historical inquiry on international 
organizations, See. MACKENZIE, David Clark. A world beyond bor-
ders: An introduction to the history of  international organizations. 
University of  Toronto Press, 2010.
2 This article analyses the proposed issues from the perspective of  
immunity as an institution of  public international law. For a recent 
study of  the same topic as an issue of  human rights, See. WEBB, 
Philippa. The Immunity of  States, Diplomats and International Or-
ganizations in Employment Disputes: The New Human Rights Di-
lemma?. European Journal of  International Law, v. 27, n. 3, p. 745-767, 
2016.
3 The present article analyzes immunities regarding labour disputes 
in the Colombian case law and is a product of  the research line on 
international law and tribunals of  the international research group 



































































































































ges have confused the sources that regulate diplomatic 
immunity, with the conventional sources that in every 
singular organization, define the extent of  the immuni-
ties of  international organizations, and as a consequen-
ce, have applied the wrong exemptions to each type of  
immunity.
2  The conventional nature and scope 
of the immunity of international 
organizations and its differences 
with diplomatic immunity, 
exemptions, and waivers.
The immunity of  international organizations is a le-
gal prerequisite to freely and effectively exercise their 
object and purpose and their particular functions at the 
international level, both in the territory of  the States 
Parties and especially in their relations with national 
authorities in the territory of  the host State. The im-
munities granted to international organizations in their 
constitutive treaties and host State agreements exist to 
prevent local  interference with their goals, which have 
been designed by the States Parties themselves, and seek 
to protect the international organizations from obsta-
cles that may come from their day-to-day relations with 
legislative, judicial or executive powers of  a State that 
voluntarily or circumstantially might want to truncate 
the goal-approached activity of  the organization, thus 
affecting the fulfillment of  its object and purpose and 
the activities of  its organs and officials, and in conse-
quence, violate their constitutive treaty.4
In the Latin American context, following the glo-
bal trend to grant functional immunity to international 
organizations in their constitutive treaties5, the notion 
previous article, part of  the same research that analyzes the way in 
which Colombian judges have interpreted their jurisdiction regard-
ing State immunities, immunities of  international organizations and 
diplomatic immunities, in any types of  disputes involving nationals, 
See. ABELLO-GALVIS, Ricardo, ARÉVALO RAMÍREZ, Walter. 
La inmunidad de las organizaciones internacionales y de sus fun-
cionarios cuando son nacionales del Estado sede. Diferencias con 
la inmunidad diplomática y experiencias de la jurisprudencia inter-
nacional y colombiana. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, v. 
XXI, 2021
4 EVANS, Malcolm. International Law. Fifth Edition. Oxford, 2018. 
5 TESFAGABIR, Kibrom. The state of  functional immunity of  
international organizations and their officials and why it should be 
streamlined. Chinese Journal of  International Law, v. 10, n. 1, p. 97-128, 
that the immunity of  international organizations and its 
scope is a matter of  their constitutive treaty and is func-
tional to their object and purpose, has been reflected 
in the regional framework of  organizations such as the 
OAS, through organizational bodies tasked with docu-
menting the international practice of  the States of  the 
region. Regarding the purpose and existence of  functio-
nal jurisdictional immunity, the Inter-American Judicial 
Committee (Comité Jurídico Interamericano6) in its re-
port on immunities of  international organizations, has 
evidenced the regional trend as a guideline for States. As 
a legal foundation for functional immunity7, the Com-
mittee has considered immunity as a direct consequence 
of  the creation of  a new legal entity, which can be ei-
ther an express or tacit creation in the constitutive treaty 
of  the international organization. It has used the UN 
Charter and the OAS Charter as examples that show 
how the creation of  a new legal entity in the head of  
the international organization, implies the concession 
of  privileges, immunities and other attributes (special 
organs, budget) necessary to the fulfillment of  their ob-
ject and purpose.  
Guideline 2.
Objective of  jurisdictional immunity
Jurisdictional immunity is granted to international 
organizations to make possible the realization of  
their object and purpose.
Rapporteur’s Notes (extracts)
In the inter-American sphere, the same tenor 
is found in the Charter of  the Organization of  
American States, which Article 133 establishes that 
the organization “… shall enjoy in the territory 
of  each one of  its Members the legal capacity, 
privileges and immunities that are necessary for 
the exercise of  its functions and the realization of  
its purposes. “ In the case of  the Inter-American 
Development Bank, its Constitutive Agreement 
establishes that “for the fulfillment of  its objective 
and the performance of  the functions conferred on 
it, the Bank will enjoy, in the territory of  each of  
the member countries, the legal status, immunities, 
exemptions, and privileges established in this 
article.  The Bank’s Constitutive Agreement allows 
the establishment of  legal actions to the extent 
that the Bank’s purpose is to provide financing to 
2011.
6 LIMA, Lucas Carlos. “The OAS Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee and the Codification of  Regional International Law.” Brazil-
ian Journal of  International Law, v. 16, p. 292, 2019.
7 WOOD, Michael. Do international organizations enjoy immunity 
under customary international law?. Immunity of  International Organi-



































































































































member states for development projects and, as 
part of  its activity, must take action before national 
courts. Immunity is therefore strictly functional and 
allows, in this case, the initiation of  procedures to 
achieve the object and purpose of  the Bank. The 
Member States have granted jurisdictional immunity 
to international organizations to facilitate the 
achievement of  their objectives with independence, 
economic rationality and without obstacles that, 
otherwise, they could face through the jurisdictional 
competence exercised by the courts of  a Member 
State frustrating the will of  most of  the Member 
States.
The ultimate purpose of  this immunity from 
jurisdiction is to ensure the independence of  the 
organization and to avoid undue interference 
in the execution of  its mandate. Otherwise, an 
organization would be subject to all kinds of  legal 
actions that would make its work impossible. In the 
case Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization, the Supreme Court of  Canada 
established that without immunity an international 
organization would be vulnerable to interference 
in its operations by the receiving State and by the 
courts of  that State.8
This principle recognized by OAS as exemplified by 
the UN Charter and developed by the Latin American 
experience on international organizations, designates 
the immunity of  international organizations as a special 
type of  immunity that emanates from the constitutive 
treaty. It is closely related to the wording of  its instru-
ments, and is, hence, governed by the law of  treaties, 
including the impossibility of  limiting it unilaterally in 
any manner by interfering authorities in labour matters 
unless it is agreed in the treaty between the constituting 
States. 
This has also been recognized in the comparative 
case law (as noted by OAS) in the Amaratunga v. Nor-
thwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization case of  the Supreme 
Court of  Canada. In the case involving NAFO, it was 
disputed whether national courts could consider that 
customary diplomatic international law, which usually 
limits diplomatic immunity in labour disputes, could be 
applied to international organizations, limiting the scope 
of  immunity in the constitutive treaty and the host-State 
agreement (usually referred as Headquarters Agreement 
or Seat Agreement). The Supreme Court9 held that the 
8 (Section Translated from Spanish by the authors). OAS. Informe 
del comité jurídico interamericano. Inmunidades de las organiza-
ciones internacionales, (93o período ordinario de sesiones OEA/
Ser. Q 6 al 16 de agosto 2018) CJI/doc.554/18 rev.2 Rio de Janeiro, 
Brasil. 16 agosto 2018.
9 VAN ERT, Gib; ALLEN, Greg J.; ROBB, Rebecca. Canadian 
immunity of  international organizations is strictly go-
verned by treaty law and national courts cannot modify 
the agreement on immunity, even if  they face situations 
in which employees face major constraints in the exer-
cise of  their right to legal procedure (see the relevant 
operative clause of  this judgment in the footnote).10
Cases such as Amaratunga in which the immunity of  
international organizations is unilaterally challenged by 
the States seeking to establish restrictions within their 
reach, especially in labour matters, or in relation to cer-
tain types of  officials, (e.g. exempting immunity when 
disputes arise between the organization and employees 
that are nationals to the host State), are the fundamen-
tal reason for defending at the jurisprudential level the 
profound differences between the immunity of  inter-
national organizations and the immunity of  diplomatic 
missions and personnel, which are, on the contrary11 
governed by customary international law.
In the matter of  diplomatic relations, immunity does 
not emanate from what is agreed in a specific instru-
ment as occurs with each of  the international organiza-
tions in its own constitutive agreement and the specific 
headquarters agreement when it further specifies privi-
leges and immunities with the host State. 
On the contrary, the foundation for diplomatic im-
munity is the sovereignty of  the State in its internatio-
nal relations, and the application of  Westphalian prin-
ciples, such as the principle of  equality between States 
and the impossibility of  acts of  empire between peers, 
Cases in Public International Law in 2013. Canadian Yearbook of  In-
ternational Law, v. 51, p. 535, 2013.
10 Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 2013 
SCC 66, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 866 https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/
scc-csc/en/item/13364/index.do: Extract: “Without immunity, an in-
ternational organization would be vulnerable to intrusions into its operations by 
the host state and that state’s courts. However, no rule of  customary interna-
tional law confers immunity on international organizations.  Instead, they derive 
their immunity from treaties, or in the case of  smaller international organiza-
tions like NAFO, from agreements with host states. […] To allow employment 
related claims of  senior officials to proceed in Canadian courts would constitute 
undue interference with NAFO’s autonomy in performing its functions and 
would amount to submitting its managerial operations to the oversight of  its 
host state’s institutions.  The absence of  a dispute resolution mechanism or of  an 
internal review process is not, in and of  itself, determinative of  whether NAFO 
is entitled to immunity.  While the fact that A has no forum in which to air his 
grievances and seek a remedy is unfortunate, it is the nature of  an immunity to 
shield certain matters from the jurisdiction of  the host State”
11 BARKER, J. Craig; WARBRICK, Colin; MCGOLDRICK, 
Dominic. State Immunity, Diplomatic Immunity and Act of  State: 
A Triple Protection against Legal Action?. The International and Com-



































































































































“Non enim una civitas potest facere legem super alteram, quia par 
in parem non habet imperium”. These State-to State legal 
principles, all informing international customary law12 
as codified by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations13, have historically and universally included 
restrictions, exceptions, and all sorts of  limitations re-
gulated by custom (the VCDR being one of  the cases 
in which a multilateral treaty reflects and reinforces cus-
tomary international law, under the well-known Baxter14 
Paradox15). They are applied to all diplomatic missions 
when it comes to private commercial acts and labour 
disputes between the diplomatic missions, diplomatic 
agents and employees from the receiving State. This is 
a very different matter from the world of  international 
organizations where the immunity of  every single orga-
nization must be subject of  an ad hoc analysis of  their 
conventional instruments and the way that immunity 
has been negotiated in each treaty. 
These types of  general exemptions to immunity in la-
bour disputes and labour relations with employees from 
the receiving State, common in diplomatic relations, can-
not be extended to the interpretation of  the immunity 
of  particular international organizations. They do reflect 
diplomatic customary international law but are not to be 
implied in the law of  international organizations, and are 
codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions (VCDR), which justifies limiting their scope only 
to diplomatic immunity, as seen in articles such as Art. 
33, numerals 1 to 3, governing social security provisions 
of  diplomats in the receiving State: 
Article 33
1.Subject to the provisions of  paragraph 3 of  this 
article, a diplomatic agent shall with respect to 
services rendered for the sending State be exempt 
12 ABELLO-GALVIS, Ricardo. La Costumbre como Fuente de 
Derecho Internacional: una Caja de Pandora Imposible de Cerrar. 
Derecho internacional: varias visiones, un maestro. Liber amicorum en 
homenaje a Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra. 2015: 3-28. Ed. Univer-
sidad del Rosario.
13 DENZA, Eileen. Diplomatic law: commentary on the Vienna con-
vention on diplomatic relations. Oxford University Press, 2016.
14 SARMIENTO LAMUS, Andrés. ¿Es la “Paradoja Baxter” una 
verdadera paradoja? La práctica de los Estados, entre la formación 
del derecho internacional consuetudinario y la interpretación de trat-
ados”. In: ABELLO-GALVIS, Ricardo; ARÉVALO RAMÍREZ, 
Walter. (ed.) Derecho Internacional Público, Derecho Internacional de la In-
versión Extranjera. Universidad del Rosario. 2019. p. 57 - 75.
15 BAXTER, Richard R. Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of  Cus-
tomary International Law. British Yearbook of  International Law, v. 41, 
p. 275, 1965.
from social security provisions which may be in 
force in the receiving State.
2.The exemption provided for in paragraph 1 of  
this article shall also apply to private servants who 
are in the sole employ of  a diplomatic agent, on 
condition:
(a) That they are not nationals of  or permanently 
resident in the receiving State; and
(b) That they are covered by the social security 
provisions which may be in force in the sending 
State or a third State.
3.A diplomatic agent who employs persons to 
whom the exemption provided for in paragraph 
2 of  this article does not apply shall observe the 
obligations which the social security provisions of  
the receiving State impose upon employers. [...]16
Also, limitations to immunities based on the natio-
nality of  the employee or member of  the Mission are 
common ground in the customary law of  diplomatic 
relations (i.e. Art. 38 of  the Vienna Convention on Di-
plomatic Relations). This is not true, however, in the law 
of  international organizations, where an organization can 
grant different degrees of  immunity to national or fo-
reign employees based only upon the agreement with the 
host State. This can range from full jurisdictional immu-
nity to national and foreign officials, to limiting, via treaty 
clauses in the constitutive agreement and the headquar-
ters agreement, the immunity of  national staff. This is 
an analysis that cannot be generalized and only depends 
upon the particular treaties of  each organization.
Article 38.1: Except insofar as additional privileges 
and immunities may be granted by the receiving 
State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of  or 
permanently resident in that State shall enjoy only 
immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in 
respect of  official acts performed in the exercise 
of  his functions. 2.Other members of  the staff  of  
the mission and private servants who are nationals 
of  or permanently resident in the receiving State 
shall enjoy privileges and immunities only to the 
extent admitted by the receiving State. However, the 
receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over 
those persons in such a manner as not to interfere 
unduly with the performance of  the functions of  
the mission.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the differen-
ces between the two types of  immunity and their origins 
in order to understand the true scope of  immunity of  
international organizations, especially when it comes to 
issues that national courts unduly believe are “naturally” 




































































































































exempt from immunity, such as labour disputes or dis-
putes involving officials who are nationals of  the host 
State in which the organization is based. 
The immunity of  international organizations is, 
when compared to immunity of  States17 and diplomatic 
envoys, a very recent and practical development of  mo-
dern international law in the twentieth century where 
the dominant instrument are treaties and the functional 
approach to international organizations allows a very 
institutional and text-based approach to immunities and 
privileges.
On the other hand, the immunity of  States and 
diplomatic missions feeds on the classic concept of  
sovereignty and is embodied in international customs 
aimed at protecting heads of  State, progressively ex-
tending throughout history to their envoys abroad. It 
has historically admitting a large number of  exceptions, 
creating a diplomatic regime which at the time of  being 
conceived did not contemplate or pretend to regulate, 
either the future concept of  an international official of  
an organization or the modern possibility that an in-
ternational organization, within its own legal capacity 
would employ nationals of  its host State as officials, and 
whether such officials, in order to be able to carry out 
their functions,  would be granted immunity, and the 
extent thereof, within their own nation States of  said 
immunity was never contemplated by the early grounds 
of  diplomatic immunity.18
For Flaherty, diplomatic immunity protects State 
equality and the sovereignty involved in certain acts of  
State. On the contrary, functional immunity of  interna-
tional organizations, aims to protect the impartiality, in-
dependence and the limited resources involved in every 
act related to the fulfillment of  the object and purpose 
of  the organization: “The immunity granted to international 
organizations (IOs.) comes from the foreign sovereign immunities 
tradition mentioned above. However, it is justified by a theory of  
“functional necessity,” which came into being after World War 
II, when emerging 1Os needed support from the States in order 
to achieve a certain degree of  maturity and therefore to be able to 
perform their duties in an unfettered manner. This kind of  im-
17 QUINTANA ARANGUREN, Juan José; GUZMÁN CARRAS-
CO, Gonzalo. De espaldas al derecho internacional: Colombia y la 
inmunidad de jurisdicción de los Estados. International Law: Revista 
Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, v. 8, p. 53-102, 2006.
18 MULLER, A. Sam. International organizations and their host 
states: aspects of  their legal relationship. Martinus Nijhoff  Publish-
ers, 1995. v. 21
munity was based on the idea that it would serve the best interests 
of  the organizations by keeping them protected from potential 
lawsuits that would negatively affect the organizations’ limited 
resources at that time or their ability to operate independently. For 
IOs, immunity was supposed to ensure their political and financial 
independence and therefore their impartiality. Since immunity of  
IOs came into being before the restrictive immunity theory had 
been adopted by many sovereign states, it was conceived and co-
dified as being absolute. Many of  these organizations actually 
have it codified in their own constituent instruments and other 
international treaties. It can also exist in the form of  headquar-
ters agreements, regional agreements, and conference agreements. 
These treaties, due to their international law character, are to be 
considered internal law of  the signatory States (at least for those 
in which treaty law is self-executing.”19
Starting from this idea of   the immunity of  inter-
national organizations as an immunity that is analyzed 
case by case according to how it had been agreed upon 
in the constitutional instrument of  the organization by 
the States Parties, it is usual to find that absolute im-
munity is established in general terms both for admi-
nistrative and judicial actions. The intent is to grant the 
organization jurisdictional immunity with respect to all 
proceedings regardless of  the nature of  the process, 
either commercial, criminal, civil, extra-contractual, la-
bour or of  any another legal nature. This jurisdictional 
immunity has been interpreted as including the right to 
not appear before national courts when summoned by 
them, and also indicating that the act of  appearance by 
an international organization, before a national court, to 
assert its own immunity before a judicial, administrative 
or diplomatic authority, never implies by itself  a waiver 
of  it, as has been recognized by the OAS Inter-Ameri-
can Judicial Committee:
Guideline 8.
Appearance before national courts
Without prejudice to their immunity from 
jurisdiction, international organizations should 
appear before national courts to assert their 
immunity or file exceptions.
Rapporteur’s Notes
[…] There is no consistent practice among 
international organizations and Member States 
regarding the appearance before national courts at 
the time of  being notified about the establishment 
19 RIOS, Greta L., FLAHERTY Edward. International Organiza-
tion Reform of  Impunity-Immunity is the Problem. ILSA Journal of  



































































































































of  a process. Particularly when it comes to cases 
covered by jurisdictional immunity, the international 
organization will not want to compromise it by 
appearing in court or even invoking its immunity.
To remedy this situation, the international 
organization should appear through diplomatic 
channels to that through the Ministry of  Foreign 
Relations immunity is asserted or exceptions are 
presented. However, there may be cases where 
the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs or any other state 
authority are entitled to appear before national 
courts. In congruence with the general obligation 
to cooperate with national authorities, as developed 
in Guideline 7 above, a good practice would consist 
in the appearance of  the international organization 
in the interest of  the own organization. On the one 
hand, it would allow the organization to assert its 
immunity and, on the other hand, it would be the 
procedural space to enforce exceptions.20
The OAS Guideline is consistent with the scope gi-
ven to the usual general expressions “any administrative 
actions” or “any judicial actions” when talking about ju-
risdictional immunity, found in constitutive treaties, by 
the most recognized doctrine21 and the case law, which 
usually find constitutive treaties broadly mentioning the 
term “judicial actions” when establishing the immuni-
ties of  an organization, without specifying whether they 
are criminal, civil, labour or of  another nature:
As international organizations are creations 
of  treaty, the determination of  the scope of  
their immunity is usually a task that entails the 
interpretation and application of  the relevant treaty 
provision. “A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of  the treaty in their context 
and in the light of  its object and purpose.”50 With 
respect to the United Nations, “Any interpretation 
of  the provisions of  the General Convention must 
be carried out within the spirit of  the underlying 
principles of  the United Nations Charter, and in 
particular Article 105 thereof, which provides that 
the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of  its 
purposes. Moreover, in accordance with article 26 
of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, 
1969 . . . every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.”51 Immunity of  international organizations 
from “every form of  legal process” has been broadly 
interpreted to include all legal proceedings before 
20 (Section Translated from Spanish by the authors). OAS Informe 
del comité jurídico interamericano. Inmunidades de las organiza-
ciones internacionales, (93o período ordinario de sesiones OEA/
Ser. Q 6 al 16 de agosto 2018) CJI/doc.554/18 rev.2 Rio de Janeiro, 
Brasil. 16 agosto 2018.
21 OKEKE, Edward Chukwuemeke. Jurisdictional immunities of  states 
and international organizations. Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 294.
national (administrative, judicial, or executive) 
authorities. It applies regardless of  whether the 
international organization is a defendant or witness. 
The immunity does not preclude the organization, 
in its own determination, from participating in 
such proceedings. However, the initiation of  
court proceedings by an international organization 
may be construed as a waiver of  its jurisdictional 
immunity in that particular case
This formula adopted by several constitutive con-
ventions of  international organizations, tending to spe-
cify that the immunity will be “from all types of  juris-
diction” (criminal, administrative, labour, etc.), has been 
accompanied by the specification that any waiver to ju-
risdiction must be an express act of  the organization or 
an express treaty provision.  Additionally, a waiver of  
immunity from jurisdiction would not imply admitting 
enforceable measures, meaning that waiving immunity 
from jurisdiction does not create any waiver for enfor-
cement, as is clearly exemplified in the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of  the Specialized Agen-
cies (United Nations) in its Art. 3, Sec. 4, which has 
been used as template for multiple constitutive and hea-
dquarters agreements.
Article III PROPERTY, FUNDS AND ASSETS 
Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property 
and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever 
held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of  
legal process except in so far as in any particular 
case they have expressly waived their immunity. It 
is, however, understood that no waiver of  immunity 
shall extend to any measure of  execution.
3  The non-applicability of the 
distinction between acts iure 
imperii and acts iure gestionis to 
international organizations as a 
defense to their immunity in labour 
disputes.
Academic literature has reiterated the impossibility 
of  exempting or revocating the immunity of  interna-
tional organizations in labour disputes unilaterally or by 
invoking general customary exemptions, as often occurs 
with diplomatic missions due to their different nature. 
This is consistent with the conclusion by specialized li-
terature that States, when recognizing the international 



































































































































equate the nature and scope22 of  its immunity with that 
of  the immunity of  diplomatic missions or with State23 
immunity, taking into account that the differences be-
tween acts “iure imperii” and acts “iure gestionis”, usually 
considered when studying the nature of  the behaviour 
of  a diplomatic envoy, are not applicable to the functio-
ning of  an international organization: 
This immunity from jurisdiction prevents law suits 
against organizations before domestic courts unless 
they have waived their immunity by consenting to 
the proceedings. As has been the case with State 
immunity, there has been pressure to restrict 
the absolute nature of  the immunity granted to 
international organizations. Indeed, a number 
of  domestic courts have applied to international 
organizations the concept of  restrictive immunity, 
granting them jurisdictional immunity only in 
relation to acts jure imperii (in the exercise of  
sovereign authority) rather than acts jure gestionis 
(done privately). Alternatively, it has been argued 
that the grant of  immunity should be conditional 
on the presence of  alternative methods of  resolving 
disputes involving international organizations 
(Gaillard and Pingel-Lenuzza, 2002). The first 
approach, which relies on an analogy with State 
immunity is based on the misapprehension that since 
international organizations are composed of  States 
they are to be placed in the same position as foreign 
States. This approach is incorrect for at least two 
reasons. First, it is contrary to the express provisions 
of  the relevant treaties. Secondly, international 
organizations are not sovereign entities and do not 
exercise sovereign authority. Their immunity is not 
granted to protect sovereign or public acts but is 
functional and granted in respect of  acts done in 
the exercise of  their functions. Such functions and 
acts may well be commercial and so classified as 
private if  done by a State. Thus immunity may arise 
for an international organization in cases where a 
foreign State will be denied immunity. For example, 
employment disputes fall within the immunity of  
an international organization even if  the relations 
with the particular employee might be classified 
as jure gestionis. The second approach, which 
conditions immunity on the existence of  alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, seeks to give effect 
to the right of  access to a court provided in human 
rights treaties and is reflected in the case law of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights.24
22 STEWART, David P. The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Im-
munities of  States and Their Property. The American Journal of  Inter-
national Law, v. 99, n. 1, p. 194-211, 2005.
23 WOJCIKIEWICZ ALMEIDA, Paula. L’affaire des immunités 
juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c. Italie): la Cour Internation-
ale de Justice à contre-sens de l’évolution du droit international. AC-
DI-Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional, v. 11, p. 21-70, 2018.
24 EVANS, Malcolm. International Law. Second Edition. Oxford, 
2006. p. 408-411. 
The OAS guidelines also reject the applicability of  
the distinction, based upon customary international law, 
of  acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis to international 
organizations. They categorically state that the scope of  
functional immunity covers all types of  acts of  the or-
ganizations performed to fulfill its object and purpose.
This is regardless of  whether they resemble political 
acts, decisions of  the governing bodies of  the organiza-
tion or constitute acts performed via private contracts 
or commercial relations, and make clear that limitations 
can only arise from express agreement between the 
member States or the organization and the host State in 
its headquarters agreement, and cannot be unilaterally 
established by national courts:
Guideline 3.
Scope of  jurisdictional immunity
International organizations, their property 
and assets enjoy immunity against all judicial 
proceedings regarding acts carried out to achieve 
their object and purpose, except in cases where the 
organization expressly waives this immunity.
Rapporteur’s Notes
[...]
As regards international organizations, immunity 
tends to be functional based on the presumption 
that it is only appropriate to recognize this immunity 
for the activities of  the organizations that are 
essential and necessary to achieve their object and 
purpose. The treaties of  each organization establish 
the acts inherent to the purpose of  the organization 
and, therefore, covered by immunity. However, 
Member States establish the scope of  jurisdictional 
immunity to be recognized by their national courts. 
At the same time, the host State agrees with the 
organization the type of  jurisdictional immunity it 
will enjoy in its territory.
Jurisdictional immunity is granted to the international 
organization as such and covers the acts it performs 
in pursuit of  its object and purpose. By virtue of  
this, the organization’s assets are also protected. 
Although the scope of  this Guide is limited to 
jurisdictional immunity, it should be specified that 
jurisdictional immunity covers property and assets, 
in order to safeguard them against any claim faced 
by the international organization.
The fact that the customary limits to diplomatic im-
munity are not applicable to the immunity of  internatio-
nal organizations, does not opposes, quite the contrary, 
that fact the principles governing functional immunity 
are at the same time enjoying strong reception by natio-



































































































































of  “functional immunity” as an emerging principle of  
customary law governing international organizations25. 
National courts have repeatedly given recognition 
to the existence and necessity of  functional immuni-
ty for international organizations within their territory 
and have customarily recognized immunity from juris-
diction as a principle26 that does not violate national so-
vereignty, but this does not mean that the exceptions 
and limitations to such immunity exist outside of  those 
expressly agreed in the constitutive agreement or in the 
headquarters agreement of  each organization and that 
they can be applied universally by national courts, as is 
the case with diplomatic immunity where its customary 
limits are widely accepted and practiced27.
This reception of  the immunity of  international or-
ganizations by national courts28 has even come to be 
recognized as a principle of  international law in judicial 
decisions29 which have indicated that national courts 
cannot restrictively interpret the immunity of  interna-
tional organizations by assimilating it to diplomatic im-
munity, thus constituting an Ultra vires30 decision. 
This was recognized in a seminal ruling by the Bel-
gian Courts of  Appeals in the Manderlier31 case. This 
judgment recognized that the Belgian lower courts shall 
not restrictively interpret the United Nations Conven-
tion on Privileges and Immunities32, not even under 
the idea of   allowing the right to access to justice for a 
plaintiff  against the organization, since the claim befo-
25 WOOD, Michael. International Organizations and Customary 
International Law. Vanderbilt journal of  transnational law, v. 48, n. 3, 
p. 609, 2015.
26 GODIO, Leopoldo. Evolución, actualidad y tendencias en ma-
teria de privilegios e inmunidades de organismos internacionales. 
Revista RECORDIP, v. 1, n. 2, 2011.
27 BROWN, Jonathan. Diplomatic immunity: State practice under 
the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly, v. 37, p. 53, 1988
28 REINISCH, August. International organizations before national courts. 
No. 10. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
29 Including: X et al. v.European School Munich I63 the Bavarian 
appellate Administrative Court, US-Iran Claims Tribunal v AS, 96 
ILR 321, 329 (Netherlands Supreme Court, 1985)
30 BELGIUM. Brussels Appeals Court. Manderlier v. United Na-
tions and Belgian State: Decision of  15 September 1969
31 Brussels Appeals Court. Manderlier v. United Nations and Bel-
gian State: Decision of  15 September 1969.United Nations Juridi-
cal Yeabook 1969. https://legal.un.org/unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/
english/by_volume/1969/chpVIII.pdf
32 MILLER, Anthony. Privileges and immunities of  United Nations 
officials. International Organizations Law Review, v.4, n. 2, p. 169-257, 
2008.
re the national courts was an obvious limitation to his 
immunity;
With regard to the argument that Article 105 of  
the United Nations Charter limited the privilege 
of  immunity to the minimum necessary to enable 
the United Nations to fulfil its purposes, the Court 
replied that in acceding to the Convention of  13 
February 1946, the signatories of  the Charter had 
defined the necessary privileges and immunities and 
that the courts would be exceeding their authority 
if  they were to arrogate to themselves the right of  
determining whether the immunities granted to the 
United Nations by that Convention were or were 
not necessary.33
4  Principal differences between 
diplomatic immunity and functional 
immunity of international 
organizations in their labour 
relations with foreign and national 
citizens from the host State, arising 
from international practice.
The differences between these types of  immunities, 
diplomatic and functional, usually arise from obvious 
situations in the daily practice of  international relations, 
which must later be elaborated in the legal field. One of  
those obvious realities is that international organizations 
do not have their own territory in which to install their 
organs, bodies, buildings and agents and freely exercise 
their powers. They are always within the territory of  a 
State Party that has decided to be its host State. This 
necessarily means that they are always at the mercy of  
some possibility of  vulnerability and interference by 
administrative or jurisdictional authorities of  that State. 
Unlike States, international organizations do not 
have a permanent population, so it is natural that they 
make up their staff  of  officials with nationals of  the 
States parties and specifically those that they find among 
the nationals who live in the host State, constituting a 
potential labour force for the organization.
Also, unlike diplomatic missions, the immunity of  
officials of  international organizations does not ema-
33 Brussels Appeals Court. Manderlier v. United Nations and Bel-
gian State: Decision of  15 September 1969. United Nations Juridi-




































































































































nate from or is exempted according to their bond of  
nationality, as occurs with members of  the diplomatic 
mission accredited abroad and with other institutions 
of  international law based on nationality, such as diplo-
matic protection34.
On similar grounds, the International Court of  Jus-
tice has repeatedly recognized that the limitations to 
the immunity of  international organizations and their 
agents can only be express and it is not possible to li-
mit jurisdictional immunity unilaterally by the host Sta-
te, a position which was settled in the advisory opinion 
“Mazilu”35 and in the advisory opinion “Immunity from 
legal process of  a Special rapporteur”36.
The differences between diplomatic immunity and 
immunity of  international organizations can also be 
observed in the mechanisms available for judging the 
responsibility of  officials protected by immunity with 
respect to their acts and the possibility that they have a 
natural judge as a consequence of  that immunity.
In the field of  diplomatic immunity, the diplomatic 
envoy and member of  a diplomatic mission abroad may 
have immunity from the courts of  the receiving State 
but will always be subject to the disciplinary and criminal 
jurisdiction of  its State of  origin. This situation is also 
customary in nature and has been codified by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
Article 31.4:The immunity of  a diplomatic agent from the 
jurisdiction of  the receiving State does not exempt him from the 
jurisdiction of  the sending State.
This inter-state logic in matters of  immunity cannot 
be used to suppose that the official of  an international 
organization does not have immunity when he or she is 
a national of  the State where it is hosted, since his or 
her function is not that of  a representative of  a State 
and a subject of  that State jurisdiction: His or her im-
munity emanates from what was agreed for the organi-
zation with its States parties and the host State.
34 MACLEAN, Robert Joseph-Blaise; ARÉVALO RAMÍREZ, 
Walter. The Expulsion of  Resident Colombian Nationals during the 
Colombia-Venezuela Border Dispute: An “Under the Radar” Case 
for Diplomatic Protection of  Human Rights?. Vniversitas, v. 68, p. 
138, 2019.
35 Applicability of  Article VI, Section 22, of  the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of  the United Nations, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 177.
36 Diference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of  a Special 
Rapporteur of  the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62 
The same argument operates in labour disputes. If  
the State and the Organization exempted, waived or res-
tricted labour disputes that might arise with employees 
that are nationals of  the host State and the organiza-
tion, and this was waived in the constitutive treaty or in 
the headquarters agreements, there will be no immunity. 
On the contrary, if  full immunity from jurisdiction was 
granted to the organization, making no exemption or 
waiver, the immunity will cover any labour dispute.
The acts of  officials of  international organizations 
and their natural judge are not classified “by default” 
with respect to a State of  origin, or the receiving or sen-
ding State as one would consider in diplomatic immu-
nity. For international organizations and their officials, 
whether or not they are nationals of  the host State, the 
natural judge, as practice has shown (And has been re-
counted by several international bodies37, such as the 
Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of  Europe, 
which in 2014 commissioned an ongoing study on im-
munities of  international organizations and their labour 
dispute resolution mechanism), is the international or-
ganization itself  through its institutional mechanisms 
for internal dispute resolution and the rules devised in 
their treaty. These organizational dispute resolution me-
chanisms (also referred as administrative tribunals) are 
competent for multiple topics, including, the discipline 
of  their officials, labour disputes or private contracts 
with local commercial entities, and have even recently 
been recognized as a necessary mechanism to deal with 
the immunities agreed in the treaties for the organiza-
tion and its officials, in order to guarantee the appli-
cants’ human right to defense and access to justice. This 
issue may arise when, paradoxically, the same officials 
who wish to take action against the organization, for 
example in a labour matter, cannot do so because the 
organizations has immunity from local courts and pro-
cedures. This is an issue that will be studied in detail 
ahead in the present article.
The inherent powers of  international organizations 
to establish these type of  tribunals or dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the context of  their immunity and as 
an expression of  their functional capacity to fulfill their 
object and purpose were recognized in the advisory opi-
37 Resolution 1979 (2014)1 Accountability of  international organi-
zations for human rights violations Parliamentary Assembly. Coun-




































































































































nion “Effect of  Awards of  Compensation Made by the 
UN Administrative Tribunal”:
It was inevitable that there would be disputes 
between the Organization and staff  members as 
to their rights and duties. The Charter contains no 
provision which authorizes any of  the principal 
organs of  the United Nations to adjudicate upon 
these disputes, and Article 105 secures for the 
United Nations jurisdictional immunities in national 
courts. It would, in the opinion of  the Court, hardly 
be consistent with the expressed aim of  the Charter 
to promote freedom and justice for individuals and 
with the constant preoccupation of  the United 
Nations Organization to promote this aim that it 
should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its 
own staff  for the settlement of  any disputes which 
may arise between it and them.38
These internal courts of  international organizations 
are precisely part of  the institutional machinery of  
functional immunity which ensure that the lack of  local 
jurisdiction for the States is not considered by national 
courts as a violation of  their sovereignty, or of  the ri-
ght to access to justice39 of  plaintiffs for certain types 
of  applications against the organization. They present 
compelling reasons for the States not to try to dilute or 
deny the immunity of  the organization.
Recent cases both in comparative law and before 
regional human rights courts, as will be analyzed be-
low, have established that these internal mechanisms 
or courts, as a component of  the recognition of  the 
organization’s immunity, in their procedure for labour 
disputes involving officials and the international orga-
nization, as an offset for the immunity, must comply 
with basic principles of  law, such as those of  impartia-
lity, motivation of  the decision, independence of  the 
members of  the panel among others. For example, this 
was debated in the Siedler40 case argued from 2003 to 
2009 in the Belgian courts. 
47. The grant of  privileges and immunities to 
international organizations is necessary to permit 
the good functioning of  these organizations 
without any unilateral interference by a national 
government. The fact that states generally grant 
immunity from jurisdiction to international 
38 Effect of  Awards of  Compensation Made by the U.N. Adminis-
trative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47 (July 13)
39 ARAÚJO KALLÁS, Fernanda. A imunidade de jurisdição das 
Organizações Internacionais face ao direito de acesso à justiça. Re-
vista de Direito Internacional – Brazilian Journal of  International Law, v. 
13, n. 3, 2016.
40 Siedler v. Western European Union, Belgian Labor Court of  Ap-
peals, Brussels, September 17, 2003, Journal des Tribunaux 2004, 
617.
organizations in their constitutive instruments or 
in additional agreements constitutes a long-dated 
practice, aimed to ensure the good functioning of  
international organizations. The importance of  this 
practice is reinforced by the tendency to enlarge 
and intensify international cooperation, which is 
illustrated in all domains of  contemporary society. 
In these conditions, the rule of  immunity from 
jurisdiction of  international organizations pursues 
a legitimate aim 
48. The question of  whether the immunity was 
proportionate to the aim pursued should be 
evaluated in light of  the particular circumstances 
of  each case. To determine whether the restriction 
of  fundamental rights flowing from such immunity 
was compatible with art. 6(1) of  the ECHR, it 
was important to examine, in accordance with the 
jurisprudence of  the ECtHR, whether the individual 
against whom such immunity was invoked had 
access to other reasonably available means to 
protect his or her rights. Article 6(1) of  the ECHR 
did not prevail over the WEU’s immunity (paras. 
48-9).
[...]
53. When determining whether the immunity 
invoked by the international organization could be 
reconciled with art. 6(1) of  the ECHR, the court 
was not to limit itself  to merely taking note of  the 
characterization of  an internal appeals commission 
as independent by the instrument which established 
that commission. The mode of  designation—by 
an intergovernmental committee—and the short 
term of  the mandate—two years—of  the members 
of  the commission were to be taken into account 
as well. These features of  the internal appeals 
commission involved the risk that the members 
would be closely tied to the organization, thereby 
lacking independence.41
According to the Belgian Courts, as long as there is 
another reasonably available mean for the plaintiff  to 
protect his or her rights before the organization, such as 
an internal labour dispute mechanism, the immunity of  
international organizations to labour disputes granted 
in its constitutive treaty does not violates the ECHR. 
5  The legal nature of the labour relations 
between international organizations 
and their staff: Applicable law, dispute 
resolution and grounds for immunity. 
Under the immunity of  international organizations 
and their capacities in the exercise of  their legal per-
sonality42, the contractual relations between them and 
41 Western European Union v Siedler, Belgian Court of  Cassation, 
21 December 2009. Paras. 48-55. 



































































































































private subjects, for example,  the provision of  services, 
goods, and regarding employment contracts, are not go-
verned by any regime of  national law. Rather, they are 
governed by the contractual autonomy of  the organi-
zation and its will in choosing the applicable law. This 
is a consequence of  the principle “lex contractus”. The 
applicable law to these relations can be stipulated in the 
particular contract between the organization and the in-
dividual, or can be chosen beforehand in the organiza-
tional law of  the international organization, contained 
in its constitutive treaty, the headquarters agreement 
or in particular resolutions produced by the binding 
organs of  the organization regarding the employment 
procedure.
Relevant case law and doctrine on the matter recog-
nize that it is usual for international organizations, when 
it comes to employment contracts or services, involving 
local officials, to “choose” the national law from the 
place where they provide their services as the law appli-
cable to the contractual relationship. This, however, is 
only as a matter of  convenience and not as an exemp-
tion to jurisdictional immunity. It is also usual, in the 
case of  international staff  members, to apply a particu-
lar labour law regime developed within the international 
organization in its resolutions. This applicable law is di-
fferent from the national labour law of  the host State43, 
is usually developed in the “Staff  Regulations” of  the 
organization and is subject to its own dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
The choice of  the applicable law by the international 
organization in its services or employment contracts, 
whether it be to decide to enter into the contract ap-
plying the national labour law or under the application 
of  the organization’s own special labour law regime, 
does not imply a waiver of  the jurisdictional immunity 
before the host State and its national courts. This, as 
explained earlier, is because that renunciation to the im-
munity as stipulated in the constitutive treaty can only 
emanate from a specific act by the organization, a stipu-
lation in the treaty itself, or a clause in the headquarters 
agreement.
Manual de derecho internacional público. Fundamentos, tribunales inter-
nacionales y casos de estudio. 2da Ed. España: Tirant Lo Blanch 
Editorial, 2020.
43 RYNGAERT, Cedric. Immunities of  International Organiza-
tions Before Domestic Courts: Reflections on the Collective Labour 
Case Against the European Patent Organization. Netherlands Year-
book of  International Law, 2015. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2016. 
p. 393-408.
11. In addition to national law, international 
law may be applicable to contracts between 
international organizations and private parties. 
Clearly, international law may become relevant as 
the law expressly chosen by the parties. This is the 
practice in the case of  some international financial 
institutions which, in their loan agreements, 
expressly exclude national law and provide for the 
application of  international law and/or general 
principles of  law (see also → Debts). Though this 
practice is mainly pursued in loan agreements with 
States, it is also sometimes used in contracts with 
private parties. Other international development 
banks generally subject their lending and borrowing 
activities to national law. Since international law 
may not be as detailed and refined as national 
contract law, its usefulness as lex contractus may be 
limited. 44
This phenomenon, characterized as “denationa-
lization” or “internationalization” of  the contractual 
relations of  the organization and private subjects, has 
been promoted as a way to guarantee neutrality both 
from the jurisdiction of  the State and its power to easily 
modify national labour law, but also has been perfor-
med partially, since it is recognized that the local labour 
force of  the organization, charged with daily tasks, is 
usually hired under the national law of  the host State, 
while the international staff, is usually hired under the 
organization’s own labour law regime.
Also, an ‘internationalization’ of  contracts 
between international organizations and private 
parties may be less important than in the case of  
→ contracts between States and foreign private 
law persons. There such a ‘denationalization’ of  
contracts serves the purpose of  insulating them 
from the power of  States to change their own law 
and thus to abrogate the contractual obligations 
they have entered into with private parties. Since 
international organizations do not have their own 
legal order comparable to a State’s ‘national’ law 
they cannot manipulate it to their advantage. Thus, 
any national law chosen may be regarded as neutral. 
12 The closest equivalent to a State’s national law, the 
internal law of  an international organization, is of  
relevance in the special case of  certain employment 
contracts with organizations. However, as a rule, 
not all kinds of  employment relationships with, 
or quasi-permanent provisions of  services to, 
international organizations are governed by such 
internal law. Rather, there is a general distinction 
between permanent staff  and local or technical 
staff  as well as less regular service providers. The 
precise delimitation between these two categories 
of  persons providing services to international 
44 REINISCH, August. Contracts between International Organi-
zations and Private Law Persons. Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public 



































































































































organizations is difficult in practice. The latter 
types of  contractual relations are usually governed 
by national law, either contractually chosen or 
determined by the applicable conflict of  laws rules.
13 Employment contracts between international 
organizations and their staff  members, on the 
other hand, are regularly exempted from national 
law. Instead, they are governed by internal 
employment law, sometimes also referred to as 
internal administrative law. It is usually codified in 
internal secondary law, often called Staff  Rules and 
Regulations, and frequently supplemented by general 
principles of  law, in particular of  employment law. 
This exemption from national employment law, 
together with the immunity from national labour 
courts, is often regarded as necessary in order to 
create and maintain a uniform and independent 
international civil service  which usually enjoy 
exclusive jurisdiction over staff  disputes, frequently 
assert that they are ‘bound exclusively by the internal 
law of  the Organization … as well as by general 
principles of  law’ (Re Waghorn ILO Administrative 
Tribunal Judgment No 28 [12 July 1957]). National 
employment law may become relevant, however, 
when there is an express choice of  law or reference 
to it in the contract or staff  rules or when it might 
be viewed as reflecting a general principle of  
employment law (Re Kock, N’Diaye and Silberreiss 
ILO Administrative Tribunal Judgment No 1450 [6 
July 1995]).45
Under this strict application of  functional immunity 
to jurisdiction and immunity from enforcing measures, 
it is not uncommon to find, inside the “staff  regula-
tions” of  the international organization, or in particu-
lar clauses in the headquarter agreements, references to 
national law. This can include particular matters such 
as vacations, probationary periods, social security and 
other matters about which the organization has no de-
sire to produce a complex regime and prefers to apply, 
as a mirror image, the local labour law. The governing 
principles of  immunity explained above, indicate that 
this free selection of  applicable law in certain matters, 
does not mean or imply a renunciation of  jurisdictional 
immunity as a whole. 
Codifying and doctrinal bodies of  international law 
such as the ILI – International Law Institute – have re-
cognized this practice between international organiza-
tions, their employees, and the host States. The Oslo 
Articles of  the ILI collect the previously explained prin-
ciples, including a) the notion that the selection of  the 
applicable law is a matter of  free choice between the or-
45 REINISCH, August. Contracts between International Organi-
zations and Private Law Persons. Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public 
International Law, v. 7, p. 754, 2006
ganization and the employee b) that the applicable law 
can include both the constitutive instruments of  the or-
ganization, its regulations and if  decided by the parties, 
references to national law without waiving immunity, 
and c) in the presence of  jurisdictional immunity, the 
necessity of  a body of  dispute resolution. 
I. The Proper Law of  the Contract
Article 2
1. To facilitate the settlement of  difficulties 
which may arise in connection with the contracts 
under consideration, it is desirable that the 
parties expressly specify the source, national or 
international, from which the proper law of  the 
contract is to be derived.
2. The parties may expressly refer to a combination 
of  several sources.
Article 3
Article 6
In so far as it constitutes the proper law of  the 
contract, the law of  the organization shall be 
considered as including the constitutive instrument, 
any other rules governing the organization and 
the practice established by the latter, these sources 
being supplemented by the general principles of  
law.46
While international case law has recognized that 
international organizations are not subject to the ap-
plication of  the labour law of  the host State, in some 
cases, both international47 and national tribunals have 
found an obligation that is correlative to the conces-
sion of   that jurisdictional immunity. This is found in 
the establishment of  an adequate mechanism for the 
resolution of  labour disputes within the organization, 
which would allow staff  and officials to exercise their 
right to defense and access to justice48 inside the bodies 
or courts of  the organizations, given the impossibility 
of  recourse to the national court system.
46 INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Session of  Oslo 
– 1977. Contracts Concluded by International Organizations with 
Private Persons (Fourth Commission, Rapporteur : Mr Nicolas Val-
ticos.
47 REINISCH, August; WEBER, Ulf  Andreas. In the shadow of  
Waite and Kennedy-The jurisdictional immunity of  international 
organizations, the individual’s right of  access to the courts and ad-
ministrative tribunals as alternative means of  dispute settlement. In-
ternational Organizations. Law Review, v. 1, p. 59, 2004.
48 RYNGAERT, Cedric, PENNINGS Frans. Jurisdictional immu-
nity and infringement of  fundamental labor rights. International Labor 



































































































































This concept was considered in the United States 
Federal case law as early as 1980, in the case Broadbent v. 
Organization of  American States, in which the United Sta-
tes Federal Court of  Appeals (D.C Cir.) held that sub-
mitting a labour dispute between an organization and 
its employees to the legislation and courts of  a State 
was improper since national courts are unsuited for the-
se kinds of  disputes and are not the correct forum to 
resolve a private dispute that applies the special labour 
regime created by the organization. This was sufficient 
reason to not waive the immunity of  the organization.
At first sight, disputes of  this sort could be referred 
to municipal tribunals. The organization normally 
possesses immunity, but immunity can be waived. 
However, the special nature of  the law governing 
employment in international organizations, 
closely linked as it is with delicate questions of  
administrative policy, makes municipal tribunals 
totally unsuited to deal with it. It would be like an 
English court trying to judge a dispute between the 
French Government and one of  its officials. Courts 
in all countries usually refuse to handle questions of  
foreign public law, and, in the same way, a number of  
municipal courts have held themselves incompetent 
to judge claims brought by international civil 
servants against the organizations which employ 
them, not on the grounds of  immunity, but on the 
grounds of  the special law applicable.
There is therefore a vacuum which needs to be filled 
by the organizations themselves. The creation of  an 
independent body, empowered to make binding 
decisions in legal disputes between an organization 
and its staff, is by no means an altruistic gesture 
from the organization’s point of  view; without 
it, officials might suffer from a sense of  injustice 
which would impair the smooth running of  the 
Secretariat.
The court notes that the OAS, like most international 
organizations, has established elaborate internal 
grievance machinery.
We hold that the relationship of  an international 
organization with its internal administrative staff  
is noncommercial, and, absent waiver, activities 
defining or arising out of  that relationship may not 
be the basis of  an action against the organization — 
regardless of  whether international organizations 
enjoy absolute or restrictive immunity.49
Additionally, the Legal Yearbook of  the United 
Nations has compiled cases, including a semi disclo-
sed “Note Verbale” of  2012, in which the organization 
makes it clear that the exemption of  “commercial acts”, 
49 Broadbent v. Organization of  Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) https://casetext.com/case/broadbent-v-organization-of-am-
states 
which constitutes customary law for diplomatic immu-
nity (iure gestionis against iure imperii) is not applicable to 
the labour relations entertained by a United Nations 
Agency and is employees because the immunity in that 
field is functional50 and “treaty based”,  meaning that 
jurisdictional immunity cannot be waived on these mat-
ters or unilaterally raised by national courts.
The Legal Counsel notes further that, in their 
submissions to the Court of  [City], the claimants 
appear to be arguing a concept of  immunity 
generally applied to sovereign states. The Legal 
Counsel wishes to point out that the concepts of  
jurisdictional immunities of  states and the privileges 
and immunities of  international organizations have 
a different nature and origin. The jurisdictional 
immunities of  states are a part of  customary 
international law that has evolved through the years 
and recently was codified in the United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of  
States and their Property, 2004. Under customary 
international law, when a state acts as a private 
person in a commercial context (jure gestionis), it 
is not immune from the jurisdiction of  the state in 
which it is acting in that capacity. In such a case, 
since the state is acting outside of  its role as a 
sovereign power, the immunity does not apply.
Unlike the case with sovereign states, the privileges 
and immunities of  the United Nations are of  a 
treaty law nature and, as explained above, originated 
in the United Nations Charter and the General 
Convention. The exception to state immunity 
in situations where the state is undertaking 
commercial activities is not provided for under the 
United Nations Charter or the General Convention 
with respect to the United Nations.
Instead, pursuant to article VIII, section 29 of  the 
General Convention, the Organization shall make 
provisions for appropriate modes of  settlement 
of, inter alia, “disputes arising out of  contracts or 
other disputes of  a private law nature to which the 
United Nations is a party.” Accordingly, there is no 
“commercial activity” exception under the General 
Convention that would be applicable with respect 
to the United Nations.
In this regard, the Legal Counsel wishes to note 
that the claimants in the above proceedings are 
therefore not without recourse. In accordance with 
article VIII, section 29 of  the General Convention, 
disputes arising out of  or in connection with the 
contracts may be subject to an appropriate mode 
of  settlement by the Organization. Based on the 
foregoing, the Legal Counsel respectfully requests 
the Government of  [State] to promptly take all 
necessary steps to ensure full respect for the 
privileges and immunities of  the United Nations 
50 SINGER, Michael. Jurisdictional Immunity of  International 
Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns. 



































































































































in [State], in accordance with its obligations under 
international law. As a courtesy, a copy of  this Note 
Verbale will also be sent to the Labour
Section of  the Court of  [State].
[...] 20 November 201251
The contemporary leading case regarding the ap-
plicable labour law in private relations between a inter-
national organization and individuals, the scope of  im-
munity in labour disputes and its relationship with the 
rights of  the applicants, is acknowledged to be Waite and 
Kennedy v. Germany from the European Court of  Human 
Rights. In this case British citizens instituted procedures 
before the German Courts against a local headquarter 
of  the European Space Agency based in Germany, whi-
ch under its Constitutive Agreement, had full jurisdic-
tional immunity.
The application claimed damages for the wrongful 
procedure in their dismissal and requested that German 
labour law was to be applied to the organization. 
The German courts, despite criticizing the dismissal 
procedure, enforced the jurisdictional immunity of  the 
organization. Accordingly, the applicants chose to bring 
an action against Germany before the European Com-
mission of  Human Rights, arguing that the decision of  
the German national courts, violated their right to ac-
cess to justice. 
The European Court of  Human Rights studied whe-
ther the immunity could had been waived by national 
courts when facing labour disputes and if  the existence 
of  a special labour law regime created by the internatio-
nal organization and its jurisdictional immunity upheld 
the standards of  the European Convention. 
62.  The Committee of  Staff  Representatives of  the 
Coordinated Organisations in their written comments 
(see paragraph 7 above) considered that the statutory 
provisions concerning immunity had to be interpreted 
so as to satisfy the fundamental rights under Article 6 § 
1 of  the Convention.
63.  Like the Commission, the Court points out that 
the attribution of  privileges and immunities to interna-
tional organisations is an essential means of  ensuring 
the proper functioning of  such organisations free from 
unilateral interference by individual governments.
51 https://legal.un.org/unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/by_vol-
ume/2012/chpVI.pdf
The immunity from jurisdiction commonly accor-
ded by States to international organisations under the 
organisations’ constituent instruments or supplementa-
ry agreements is a long-standing practice established in 
the interest of  the good working of  these organisa-
tions. The importance of  this practice is enhanced by a 
trend towards extending and strengthening internatio-
nal cooperation in all domains of  modern society.
Against this background, the Court finds that the 
rule of  immunity from jurisdiction, which the German 
courts applied to ESA in the present case, has a legiti-
mate objective.
64.  As to the issue of  proportionality, the Court 
must assess the contested limitation placed on Article 6 
in the light of  the particular circumstances of  the case.
65.  The Government submitted that the limitation 
was proportionate to the objective of  enabling inter-
national organisations to perform their functions effi-
ciently. With regard to ESA, they considered that the 
detailed system of  legal protection provided under 
the ESA Convention concerning disputes brought by 
staff  and under Annex I in respect of  other disputes 
satisfied the standards set in the Convention. In their 
view, Article 6 § 1 required a judicial body, but not 
necessarily a national court. The remedies available 
to the applicants were an appeal to the ESA Appeals 
Board if  they wished to assert contractual rights, their 
years of  membership of  the ESA staff  and their inte-
gration into the operation of  ESA. According to the 
Government, the applicants were also left with other 
possibilities, such as claiming compensation from the 
foreign firm which had hired them out.
66.  The Commission in substance agreed with the 
Government that in private-law disputes involving ESA, 
judicial or equivalent review could be obtained, albeit in 
procedures adapted to the special features of  an inter-
national organisation and therefore different from the 
remedies available under domestic law.52
The ECtHR recognized the right of  international 
organizations under their constitutive agreements to 
create their own labour law, and that pursuant to juris-
dictional immunity, the organization was not bound to 
apply national labour law unless there was an exception 





































































































































to immunity in this matter agreed in the treaties. Since 
the application was against a State, the ECtHR conclu-
ded that the German courts, by upholding the immu-
nity of  the organization, did not violate the applicants’ 
right to access to justice, given that this immunity was 
backed by other means for the applicants to exercise 
their rights. 
72. The Court shares the Commission’s conclusion 
that, bearing in mind the legitimate aim of  immunities 
of  international organisations (see paragraph 
63 above), the test of  proportionality cannot be 
applied in such a way as to compel an international 
organisation to submit itself  to national litigation 
in relation to employment conditions prescribed 
under national labour law. To read Article 6 § 1 of  
the Convention and its guarantee of  access to court 
as necessarily requiring the application of  national 
legislation in such matters would, in the Court’s 
view, thwart the proper functioning of  international 
organisations and run counter to the current trend 
towards extending and strengthening international 
cooperation. 
73. In view of  all these circumstances, the Court 
finds that, in giving effect to the immunity from 
jurisdiction of  ESA on the basis of  section 20(2) of  
the Courts Act, the German courts did not exceed 
their margin of  appreciation. Taking into account 
in particular the alternative means of  legal process 
available to the applicants, it cannot be said that 
the limitation on their access to the German courts 
with regard to ESA impaired the essence of  their 
“right to a court” or was disproportionate for the 
purposes of  Article 6§ 1 of  the Convention.
74.  Accordingly, there has been no violation of  that 
provision. 53
The Waite case has received positive reception 
both from national courts54 and regional bodies, 
strengthening the acceptance of  the principle that 
the proportionality between jurisdictional immunity 
and the right to defense is preserved if  there is an 
adequate mechanism for internal dispute resolution 
used by the organization to provide a timely 
response to the requests of  its employees.
Certain States like Belgium55 have gone beyond Wai-
te and have decided to exempt the immunity of  inter-
national organizations if  they do not have, or do not 
activate or properly design this internal mechanism in 
order to resolve such disputes. This cannot be conside-
53 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, Merits, App No 26083/94, 
ECHR 1999-I https://iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
Waite-and-Kennedy-v.-Germany.pdf  
54 NOLLKAEMPER, André, et al. (ed.) International law in domestic 
courts: a casebook. USA: Oxford University Press, 2019.
55 DE BRABANDERE, Eric. Belgian Courts and the Immunity of  
International Organizations. International Organizations Law Re-
view, v. 10, n. 2, p. 464-504, 2014.
red a universal trend or a new customary rule, since this 
behavior arises from the State´s obligation under the 
European Convention Art 6, as was argued in the cases 
Lutchmaya v. General Secretariat of  African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of  States, Brussels Labor Court, March 4, 2003, 
Journal des Tribunaux, 2003 and Siedler v. Western Euro-
pean Union, Appeal Judgment, JT 2004, 617, ILDC 53 (BE 
2003), 17th September 2003, Belgium; Brussels; Labor Court 
of  Appeal; 4th Chamber). For example, in the Siedler case, 
the Belgian Courts studied whether the levels of  inde-
pendence of  the internal dispute resolution mechanism 
of  the international organization upheld ECtHR stan-
dards and concluded that if  the body is not indepen-
dent, the immunity can be waived. This was, yet again, 
in a particular application of  the European Convention, 
and leaves several questions regarding the breach of  the 
treaty by the State, open.
“The mode of  designation – by an intergovernmental 
committee – and the short term of  the mandate 
– two years – of  the members of  the commission 
were to be taken into account as well. These features 
of  the internal appeals commission involved the 
risk that the members would be closely tied to the 
organization, thereby lacking independence [my 
emphasis].”56
On a more regional level, the 2018 OAS Guidelines 
on International Organizations by the Interamerican Ju-
dicial Committee have incorporated the Waite standard 
from the ECtHR and made clear as a practice for La-
tin American States and international organizations in 
the region that a natural counterpart for that functional 
immunity, is the ability of  the organization57 to resolve 
labour disputes internally: 
Guideline 6.
Characteristics of  dispute resolution mechanisms
The dispute settlement mechanisms established by 
international organizations to
resolving private law disputes should be adequate 
and effective.
Rapporteur’s Notes
The European Court of  Human Rights in its case 
Waite and Kennedy v. Germany15 has established 
that immunity depends on the availability of  
adequate and effective remedies. To maintain 
56 Belgian Court of  Cassation, Western European Union v Siedler, 
Appeal Judgment Cass No S 04 0129 F (21 December 2009)
57 BERENSON, William M. Squaring the Concept of  Immunity 
with the Fundamental Right to a Fair Trial: The Case of  OAS. World 



































































































































immunity the European Court has indicated three 
requirements:
(i) immunity must not restrict or reduce the right to 
due process;
(ii) the limitations on immunity must pursue a 
legitimate purpose;
(iii) there is a reasonable relationship of  
proportionality between the means used and the 
end accomplished.
The functional nature of  immunities makes it 
necessary to preserve the right of  access to justice 
for individuals. Therefore, it is not enough that 
there is an obligation to establish dispute resolution 
mechanisms. These Mechanisms should be 
adequate and effective.
Additionally, the principles of  independence, 
transparency, professionalism, decentralization, 
Legality and due process should govern such 
mechanisms. Finally, the organization must 
disseminate its mechanisms duly among staff, in 
order to avoid ignorance of  them.58
The number of  international organizations with in-
ternal dispute resolution mechanism makes it difficult 
to present a study of  every single example in the present 
article. It is illustrative, however, to present some trea-
ty clauses or staff  regulations that develop the dispute 
resolution mechanisms for labour disputes that interna-
tional organizations have designed, so as to demonstrate 
the way in which these guarantee the due process of  the 
employees and fulfill the goal of  jurisdictional immunity 
from labour courts without undermining the rights of  
the claimants. For instance, the Staff  Regulations and 
Rules of  the United Nations (2018) from rules 11.0 to 
11.5 contemplate a mechanism that involves informal 
resolution, the participation of  an ombudsman, a for-
mal complaint before a tribunal and a formal appeal be-
fore an appeals tribunal. 
Rule 11.1
  Informal resolution
 (a) A staff  member who considers 
that his or her contract of  employment or terms 
of  appointment have been violated is encouraged 
to attempt to have the matter resolved informally. 
To that end, a staff  member who wishes to pursue 
informal channels should approach the Office of  
the Ombudsman without delay, without prejudice 
to the right to pursue the matter formally in 
58 OAS. Informe del comité jurídico interamericano. Inmunidades 
de las organizaciones internacionales, (93o período ordinario de se-
siones OEA/Ser. Q 6 al 16 de agosto 2018) CJI/doc.554/18 rev.2 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 16 agosto 2018 
accordance with the provisions of  the present 
chapter. 
 (b) Both the staff  member and the 
Secretary-General may initiate informal resolution, 
including mediation, of  the issues involved at any 
time before or after the staff  member chooses to 
pursue the matter formally.
 (c) The conduct of  informal resolution 
by the Office of  the Ombudsman, including 
mediation, may result in the extension of  the 
deadlines applicable to management evaluation 
and to the filing of  an application with the United 
Nations Dispute Tribunal, as specified in staff  rules 
11.2 (c) and (d) and 11.4 (c) below. 
 (d) An application shall not be 
receivable by the United Nations Dispute Tribunal 
if  the dispute arising from a contested decision has 
been resolved by an agreement reached through 
mediation. However, a staff  member may submit 
an application directly with the Dispute Tribunal 
to enforce the implementation of  an agreement 
reached through mediation within 90 calendar days 
of  the deadline for implementation as specified in 
the mediation agreement or, when the mediation 
agreement is silent on the matter, within 90 calendar 
days of  the thirtieth calendar day from the date on 
which the agreement was signed.59
The World Bank Tribunal Statute also contemplates 
mediation mechanisms for employment disputes to be 
exhausted between the staff  member and the corres-
ponding organ before a formal complaint can be enter-
tained by the tribunal in a more judicial manner. Several 
other examples can be reviewed in the Staff  regulations 
or resolutions that constitute the tribunals of  the or-
ganizations, such as the Article 270 of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU)60, the 
ILO Administrative tribunal61, the NATO Administra-
tive Tribunal62 or the OECD Administrative Tribunal63
1. The Tribunal shall hear and pass judgment upon 
any application by which a member of  the staff  
of  the Bank Group alleges non-observance of  the 
contract of  employment or terms of  appointment 
of  such staff  member. The words “contract of  
employment” and “terms of  appointment” include 
all pertinent regulations and rules in force at the 
time of  alleged non-observance including the 
provisions of  the Staff  Retirement Plan.
59 https://hr.un.org/content/staff-rules-112 









































































































































2. No such application shall be admissible, except 
under exceptional circumstances as decided by the 
Tribunal, unless:
(i) the applicant has exhausted all other remedies 
available within the Bank Group, except if  the 
applicant and the respondent institution have 
agreed to submit the application directly to the 
Tribunal; and
(ii) the application is filed within one hundred and 
twenty days after the latest of  the following:
(a) the occurrence of  the event giving rise to the 
application;
(b) receipt of  notice, after the applicant has 
exhausted all other remedies available within 
the Bank Group, that the relief  asked for or 
recommended will not be granted; or
(c) receipt of  notice that the relief  asked for or 
recommended will be granted, if  such relief  shall 
not have been granted within thirty days after 
receipt of  such notice.
3. For the purposes of  this Statute:
the expression “member of  the staff ” means any 
current or former member of  the staff  of  the 
Bank Group, any person who is entitled to claim 
upon a right of  a member of  the staff  as a personal 
representative or by reason of  the staff  member’s 
death, and any person designated or otherwise 
entitled to receive a payment under any provision 
of  the Staff  Retirement Plan.64
6  Remarks on the Colombian case 
law regarding immunities of 
the international organizations 
in labour disputes: judicial 
misapplication of the exemptions 
emanating from diplomatic immunity.
Finally, this article concludes with an analysis of  a 
particularly complex case of  reception and misinterpre-
tation of  the principles governing diplomatic immunity 
and the immunity of  international organizations in la-
bour disputes. At the Constitutional Court of  Colom-
bia65, the debate on the jurisdictional immunity of  in-
ternational organizations and diplomatic missions has 
64 https://tribunal.worldbank.org/statute 
65 ABELLO-GALVIS, Ricardo, ARÉVALO RAMÍREZ, Walter. La 
inmunidad de las organizaciones internacionales y de sus funcionar-
ios cuando son nacionales del Estado sede. Diferencias con la inmu-
nidad diplomática y experiencias de la jurisprudencia internacional 
y colombiana. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, v. XXI, 2021.
taken a spotlight through its two main judicial areas of  
jurisdiction.
The first, namely the “abstract control of  constitu-
tionality (automatic judicial review)”66, occurs when the 
Constitutional Court, in the face of  the laws approving 
a treaty prior to its entry into force, within the ratifi-
cation process, or, in the face of  public actions of  un-
constitutionality (judicial review actions) against those 
laws approving the treaty67. Under these procedures, the 
Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality 
of  different instruments that contain precepts of  the 
two aforementioned types of  immunities: treaties cons-
tituting international organizations, and treaties related 
to diplomatic immunity.
The second of  these areas of  jurisdiction under 
which the Constitutional Court of  Colombia has en-
tertained cases related to immunity, is called “specific 
control” (control concreto68), where citizens by means of  
individual suit actions or applications can claim against 
public or private subjects before any judge to guarantee 
their fundamental constitutional rights against a speci-
fic damage. Under this type of  jurisdiction, there have 
been numerous cases against diplomatic missions and 
international organizations claiming protection from 
human rights violations, including those arrising out of  
labour disputes. 
Recurrently, the Colombian case law as it will be 
shown below, has adequately recognized the rationale 
behind the immunity of  international organizations and 
their functional relationship with the object and purpo-
se of  the organization, considering that such immuni-
ty is both necessary for the organization and does not 
constitute a violation of  the sovereignty of  the host 
State. It has, however, erroneously transferred the cus-
tomary limitations and exemptions of  the immunity of  
66 ARÉVALO RAMÍREZ, Walter; GARCÍA LÓPEZ, Luisa Fer-
nanda. La interpretación constitucional y sus métodos en el sistema 
jurídico norteamericano, una interacción entre lo político y lo ju-
rídico: Teorías y casos de estudio. Ius et Praxis, v. 24, n. 2, p. 393-430, 
2018. 
67 ABELLO GALVIS, Ricardo. La Corte Constitucional y el dere-
cho internacional Los tratados y el control previo de constitucion-
alidad 1992-2004. Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, v. 7, n. 1, p. 305-382, 2005.
68 GARCÍA-MATAMOROS, Laura Victoria, ARÉVALO-
RAMÍREZ, Walter. Dos décadas de debates entre la Constitución 
de 1991 y el derecho internacional: El control constitucional de los 
tratados, las enmiendas constitucionales y la oposición a sentencias 
de tribunales internacionales. De la constitución de 1991 a la realidad: 
Debates políticos, jurídicos, territoriales e internacionales. Universi-



































































































































diplomatic missions, such as not granting immunity to 
nationals, and excluding or limiting it in commercial or 
labour relations, to the immunity of  international orga-
nizations, contrary to its conventional scope.
A relevant starting point for a case law analysis, is 
the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) judgment 
C-254 of  2003, where the Constitutional Court recog-
nizes that the immunity of  international organizations 
is the product of  what is agreed in its Constitutive 
Treaty and that functional immunity is governed by 
the agreement by the States Parties. The CCC held that 
an immunity agreement on jurisdiction does not per se 
violate national sovereignty or the principle of  equality 
(of  individuals before the law), This position was origi-
nally advanced in CCC judgment C-203 of  1995, a case 
involving the judicial review of  the law approving the 
treaty of  the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Extended ex-
tracts from the decision in Spanish can be found in the 
footnote69.
69 CCC Judgment C-254/03. Para comenzar es necesario advertir que la 
jurisprudencia constitucional ha admitido la introducción de cláusulas de inmu-
nidad en los tratados internacionales como reconocimiento de que las mismas son 
medios “que han existido para asegurar la independencia de los representantes 
diplomáticos, y que se han extendido a las organizaciones internacionales, a sus 
bienes y funcionarios también para asegurar la autonomía de esas entidades.”[9] 
.  Adujo en este contexto que la institución de la inmunidad no es per se contraria 
al ordenamiento jurídico.
Lo mismo subrayó cuando revisó la exequibilidad de la Ley 464 de 1998 
que aprobó el “Convenio Internacional de las Maderas Tropicales”, suscrito en 
Ginebra en 1994. El artículo 17 de dicha Convención establece un sistema de 
inmunidades y privilegios similar al que contiene la Convención sobre asistencia 
en caso de accidente nuclear o emergencia radiológica. El numeral 3º de dicho 
artículo señala que “La organización [Internacional de Maderas Tropicales] 
podrá concertar con uno o más países acuerdos, que habrán de ser aprobados por 
el Consejo, sobre las facultades, privilegios e inmunidades que sean necesarios 
para el debido funcionamiento del presente Convenio.”
En relación con esta disposición, que faculta a la Organización internacional 
para establecer regímenes de inmunidades a favor de sus miembros, la Corte 
adujo que las inmunidades y privilegios conferidos a miembros de organismos 
internacionales se ajustan a la Carta Política siempre y cuando estén encamina-
das a la “defensa, igualdad y soberanía del organismo de derecho internacional 
de que se trate y de los Estados que acuerdan conceder dichas prerrogativas[10] 
.” La Corte agregó que de no hacerse tal salvedad, “[b]ajo el manto de buenas 
intenciones patrocinadas por el Convenio, que la Corte respeta y alienta, (...) 
cláusulas como la analizada pueden constituirse en el germen de tratamientos 
diferenciales y privilegiados que den cabida a injusticias y desequilibrios.”
Dicha posición refrendó lo sostenido por la Corte en la Sentencia C-137 de 
1996 a propósito de la revisión constitucional de la Ley 208 de 1995, por la 
cual se aprobó el “Estatuto del Centro Internacional de Ingeniería Genética y 
Biotecnología”, hecho en Madrid en 1983.
Al igual que la Convención sobre el manejo de maderas tropicales, el Estatuto 
del Centro Internacional de Ingeniería Genética y Biotecnología cuenta con una 
norma destinada a regular los privilegios e inmunidades de los miembros del 
Centro. El artículo 13 del Estatuto prescribe, entre otras cosas, que “6. Los 
Erroneously, in CCC Judgment C-788 of  2011 re-
garding the Agreement on Cooperation and Regime of  
Privileges and Immunities between the International 
Organization for Migrations and the government of  
the Republic of  Colombia,  the Court, through a mi-
sinterpretation of  the nature of  diplomatic immunity 
and its distinction with the immunity of  international 
organizations, extended the customary limitations on 
immunity inherent to diplomatic missions to interna-
tional organizations, while disregarding the principles 
explained above and their treaty based nature.
The areas in  which the judgment unduly extends 
the limitations to diplomatic immunity to the regime of  
international organizations include: i) labour matters, in 
which diplomatic missions and international organiza-
tions when hiring nationals would be subject to national 
labour law and national social security law ii) commer-
cial transactions, “private contracts” and inheritance 
law, where it indicated that members of  the diplomatic 
corps do not have immunity for acts outside their func-
tion of  representing the State and must submit to civil 
jurisdiction, as well as for “commercial acts”, an excep-
tion which, as we have seen above, cannot be applied 
to the international organization since the difference 
between acts iure gestionis and iure imperii do not apply. 
Regarding administrative and criminal matters, the CCC 
held that the immunity must be interpreted close to the 
constitutive agreement, allowing affected citizens by 
such immunity to sue the State, a position also concur-
red by the Council of  State.70
This Corporation has defined the following limita-
tions on the immunity of  agents of  foreign States and 
international law organizations that are in the national 
territory in the guardianship headquarters and in mat-
ters of  constitutionality control: 1. The labor jurisdic-
tion. In judgment T-932 of  2010, the Court analyzed 
the case of  a citizen in favor of  whom the Diplomatic 
Mission of  the Embassy of  the Bolivarian Republic of  
funcionarios del Centro gozarán de las prerrogativas e inmunidades que dispone 
el Artículo V de la Convención sobre Prerrogativas e Inmunidades de las Na-
ciones Unidas”, que “5. Los representantes de los Miembros gozarán de las 
prerrogativas e inmunidades que dispone el Artículo IV de la Convención sobre 
Prerrogativas e Inmunidades de las Naciones Unidas”, y que “7.  Los expertos 
del Centro gozarán de las mismas prerrogativas e inmunidades estipuladas para 
los funcionarios del Centro en el párrafo 6 que antecede.”
Frente a dichas disposiciones la Corte sostuvo que las inmunidades conferidas a 
los miembros de un organismo internacional son concesiones ofrecidas con funda-
mento en disposiciones de derecho internacional que no quebrantan por sí mismas 
el concepto de soberanía nacional.



































































































































Venezuela in Colombia stopped making contributions 
to the Pension System. In order to resolve the speci-
fic case, in the general considerations of  the ruling, the 
Ninth Review Chamber reached three main conclu-
sions: (i) progressively, international law has recognized 
that States and international organizations have restric-
ted immunity in labor matters, In other words, it has 
accepted that diplomatic missions and supranational or-
ganizations can be called to trial by local courts “when 
labor and benefit rights of  nationals and permanent re-
sidents of  the national territory are compromised [...].”; 
(ii) when a foreign State enters into an employment 
contract with a Colombian national, it must submit un-
restrictedly to internal labor regulations, which is why “a 
sending State cannot claim immunity for claims derived 
from the employment contract or the performance of  
relations labor. ”; . ”; and (iii) the conclusion of  em-
ployment contracts with Colombian nationals obliges 
diplomatic missions and supranational organizations to 
assume the risk of  old age, “through the affiliation of  
the worker to the Social Security Institute or even to 
other social welfare entities that cover such a risk. “ In 
line with the conclusions noted, when verifying that the 
plaintiff  could go before the labor judges to obtain the 
protection of  her claims, and in view of  the need to 
adopt urgent and urgent measures to guarantee the pro-
tection of  her fundamental rights to the minimum vital 
and safety social, the Court granted the protection filed 
as a transitory mechanism and ordered the Head of  the 
Diplomatic Mission of  the Embassy of  the Bolivarian 
Republic of  Venezuela in Colombia to pay the plaintiff  
“the sum equivalent to a legal monthly minimum wage 
in force in accordance with Colombian regulations , as a 
provisional old-age pension and until the ordinary labor 
courts resolve the substantive dispute regarding labor 
rights that the plaintiff  will raise. “ Thus, it can be con-
cluded that the protection action is appropriate to ob-
tain the protection of  the fundamental rights to the vital 
minimum, to work and to social security of  those who 
have provided their services to a diplomatic mission or 
an international organization, when the employer has 
omitted to comply with the duty to make the corres-
ponding contributions to the Pension System.
Judgment C-788 of  2011 which deepens the diffi-
culty of  its approach to the immunity of  international 
organizations shows that the Constitutional Court took 
as a generalizable parameter, the limitations to immu-
nity agreed in the “Convention on Special Missions of  
the United Nations”, a treaty that was analyzed by the 
Court in judgment C-315 of  2004 and that is repeate-
dly cited in decisions such as C-788 of  2011. The li-
mitations on immunity agreed to in that treaty cannot 
be extended to all international organizations and their 
constituent conventions, but the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court seems to take it as a guide to understanding 
immunity itself.71
This argument regarding the exemptions, waivers 
and limitations to the immunity of  international organi-
zations derived from diplomatic immunity in judgment 
C-788 of  2011, is replicated in judgment C-267 of  2014 
on the Agreement between Colombia and the Organi-
zation for the Prohibition of  Chemical Weapons regar-
ding its Privileges and Immunities (OPCW).72
71 CCC Judgment C-788 of  2011. Mediante la sentencia C-315 de 2004, 
la Sala Plena de esta Corte declaró la constitucionalidad de “La Convención 
sobre las Misiones Especiales” de las Naciones Unidas -abierta a la firma en 
Nueva York el 16 de diciembre 1969-, así como de la Ley aprobatoria 824 
de 2003. De acuerdo con el artículo 31 de dicha Convención, los representantes 
de un Estado y los miembros del personal diplomático gozan de inmunidad 
civil y administrativa, salvo en estos casos: “a) una acción real sobre bienes 
inmuebles particulares radicados en el territorio del Estado receptor, a menos 
que la persona de que se trate los posea por cuenta del Estado que envía para 
los fines de la misión; || b) una acción sucesoria en la que la persona de que se 
trate figure, a título privado y no en nombre del Estado que envía, como ejecutor 
testamentario, administrador, heredero o legatario; || c) una acción referente 
a cualquier actividad profesional o comercial ejercida por la persona de que se 
trate en el Estado receptor, fuera de sus funciones oficiales; [y] || d) una acción 
por daños resultante de un accidente ocasionado por un vehículo utilizado fuera 
de las funciones oficiales de la persona de que se trate”. Con fundamento en las 
disposiciones anteriores, en la citada sentencia, luego de reiterar que el principio 
de inmunidad de jurisdicción restringida no contradice la Constitución pues no 
vulnera por sí mismo el principio de igualdad, la Corte afirmó que los artículos 
que abordan el tema contenidos en la Convención deben ser entendidos de confor-
midad con (i) la jurisprudencia del Consejo de Estado en lo concerniente a la ju-
risdicción administrativa, y (ii) los demás artículos de la misma Convención que 
se refieren a las obligaciones generales que deben satisfacer los integrantes de una 
misión diplomática. […]. 3. La jurisdicción penal. La citada Convención sobre 
las Misiones Especiales de las Naciones Unidas, incorporada al ordenamiento 
jurídico interno por la Ley 824 de 2003, también señala en su artículo 31 que 
los representantes de un Estado y los miembros del personal diplomático gozan 
de inmunidad penal en el Estado receptor.”.
72 CCC Judgment C-267 of  2014:
5.2.1 El tema del principio de inmunidad de jurisdicción frente a la procedibi-
lidad de la acción de tutela contra organismos internacionales para obtener la 
protección del derecho fundamental de petición, únicamente ha sido abordado por 
la Corte en tres sentencias, por lo que en seguida se hará una breve referencia a 
cada una de ellas:
5.2.1.1 En la sentencia T-883 de 2005, la Corte estudió las sentencias pro-
feridas en el trámite de la acción de tutela instaurada por un ciudadano contra el 
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), por considerar 
que dicho programa vulneró sus derechos fundamentales de petición y honra.[…] 
Para resolver el caso concreto, en las consideraciones generales de la sentencia, la 
Sala Quinta de Revisión explicó que en el ámbito constitucional, el principio de 
inmunidad de jurisdicción debe atender a varios aspectos. En primer lugar, señaló 



































































































































In the field of  “acción de tutela” (a specific control or 
writ for protection of  constitutional rights) (Also called 
“Recurso de Amparo” in Latin America), in cases invol-
ving a request to international organizations to appear 
before national authorities, the Constitutional Court has 
held different positions. On the one hand, it reinforces 
the exceptions to immunity already admitted in its other 
previously cited judgments, while on the other, it creates 
an unclear position regarding the duty to appear before 
national authorities and courts when an international 
organization is summoned.
The Constitutional Court in judgment T-611 of  
2011, compiles cases in which international organiza-
tions based in their territory have been called to respond 
to requests from authorities or citizens and compares it 
with the customary obligation of  diplomatic missions 
to respond to these requests when the summons invol-
ves a labour dispute with a national. 
In its dictum, the Constitutional Court mentions 
that international organizations have to present them-
selves before national authorities in private disputes, or 
disputes involving labour law and disputes involving 
fundamental rights, to the extent that such appearance 
does not affect its object and purpose. 
This last test, although more favorable than a total 
waiver of  immunity in the matter by national courts, 
does not correspond to the precepts already described, 
para conductas arbitrarias y que pueden resultar lesivas de derechos consagrados 
y protegidos por el ordenamiento interno”, pues la inmunidad otorgada por el 
Estado colombiano a un organismo de derecho internacional, solo puede ser con-
siderada constitucional si responde “a la necesidad de asegurar la independencia 
y neutralidad de las labores que desarrolle el sujeto de derecho internacional cor-
respondiente.” En segundo lugar, sostuvo que dada la tendencia actual seguida 
por la mayoría de Estados de conceder inmunidad restringida a autoridades 
extranjeras, “es posible que el texto mismo del tratado o convenio respectivo, 
establezca el mecanismo a través del cual se pueden solucionar las controversias 
en las que se vean involucrados sujetos que gozan de inmunidades reconocidas por 
los Estados, con lo que se garantiza, además, la protección efectiva de los derechos 
de los individuos[25].” Y en tercer lugar, concluyó que ante la necesidad de 
garantizar la protección de los derechos vulnerados, particularmente del derecho 
al acceso a la administración de justicia, “en los casos en los que la protección 
del derecho exija la realización de determinada conducta por el sujeto que goza 
de inmunidad, podría el afectado solicitar al Estado colombiano que supla la 
actuación del funcionario u organización respectiva, en el evento en que ello fuere 
posible, toda vez que por esa vía se garantizarían los derechos de la persona, 
respetando la inmunidad que fue reconocida por el Estado.”
Con fundamento en lo anterior, la Corte negó el amparo de los derechos fun-
damentales invocados, al estimar que era el Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público en calidad de organismo ejecutor del Proyecto para la Modernización de 
la Administración Financiera Pública, y no el PNUD, la entidad encargada de 
dar respuesta a la petición presentada por el actor.
namely, that international law contemplates for full 
functional-jurisdictional immunity. 
Another decision in which the CCC proceeded to 
limit the immunity of  international organizations, by 
identifying a “duty” to appear before national autho-
rities, is judgment T-093 of  2012, which although rea-
ffirms the immunity from jurisdiction and execution, 
affirms that Colombia has been part of  the historical 
process in which diplomatic immunities are being trans-
ferred to the sphere of  international organizations. 
It is at this point in which the constitutional court 
erroneously transfers the exceptions emanating from 
diplomatic custom to diplomatic immunity. 
4.2.1. The Colombian State has recognized that 
the immunities and prerogatives granted by the 
country to officials of  international organizations 
or diplomatic representatives of  other States, in 
guarantee of  the need to ensure the independence 
and neutrality of  the work carried out by the 
corresponding international law subject, harmonize 
with the provisions of  the Political Constitution. It 
is mainly about the United Nations Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities of  February 13, 1946, 
ratified by Colombia through Law 62 of  1973, 
an instrument of  which Colombia is a party and 
is bound since it has not denounced it, nor has it 
conditioned or reserved any of  its provisions.
4.2.2. Immunity, for the case at hand, constitutes, 
then, a procedural rule that operates as an exception 
and which has two fundamental manifestations: (i) 
immunity from jurisdiction as such, which refers 
to the incompetence of  national judges to judge 
certain subjects of  international law, which may 
be other States or international organizations and 
(ii) immunity from execution, which prevents a 
certain judicial decision from being made effective, 
in the event that the procedure against the subject 
of  international law is have carried out [10]. In this 
regard, the Court has expressed:
[...] from the principle of  sovereignty, independence 
and equality of  the States, a rule of  public 
international law is derived, recognized by 
custom and international conventions by virtue 
of  which the agents and property of  foreign 
States must be immune from the coercive action 
of  the public authorities of  the host States. This 
principle was extended to the officials and assets 
of  international agencies or centers in order to 
guarantee, fundamentally, the independence of  said 
organizations in the fulfillment of  their functions, 
wherever, by virtue of  an international agreement, 
they operate.73.



































































































































In sum, the reception and development of  the im-
munity principles explained above by the Colombian 
jurisdiction is contradictory. Colombian constitutional 
jurisprudence, does not correctly identify the nature, 
scopes or sources that govern diplomatic and interna-
tional organizations, generating confusion about the 
restrictions that are admissible to each one.
7 Conclusion 
As a concluding remark, it is important to say that 
even if  functional immunity and jurisdictional immu-
nity of  international organizations are concepts that 
tend to be clear in doctrine, casebooks and theory, their 
reception by national courts or their scope under the 
scrutiny of  international tribunals is still evolving in 
the field of  labour disputes. The differences with di-
plomatic immunity from the point of  view of  sources 
of  international law are clear but both international and 
national jurisdictions still struggle with the applicable 
law to labour relations between the organizations and 
individuals, thus undermining the immunity as concei-
ved in the constitutive instrument of  international orga-
nizations, usually by applying exemptions arising from 
customary international law in the field of  diplomatic 
immunity, to international organizations, where such 
exemptions may have not been contemplated in their 
constitutive treaties.
 Regarding the misconception about immunities in 
the Colombian case law, it is urgent to recover the sepa-
ration by national courts of  the two types of  immunity 
and their scope in the Colombian jurisdiction, so as to 
avoid that this limitation to the immunity of  internatio-
nal organizations keeps leading to arbitrariness in the 
decisions of  the judges and national authorities. These 
violations and limitations on the immunity of  interna-
tional organizations as the International Court of  Justi-
ce has recognized in the 1949 advisory opinion “Repa-
ration for injuries suffered in the service of  the United 
Nations”, can generate a right to the international or-
ganization, as a subject of  international law, to invoke 
international responsibility against the State and claim 
reparation for the damage through all the diplomatic 
and jurisdictional mechanisms at its disposal.
Finally, the duty to constitute an internal dispute re-
solution mechanism for labour disputes inside the inter-
national organizations that can correctly apply the staff  
regulations and the special labour regime devised by the 
organization, as a counterpart for the recognition of  the 
immunity, is a development that is still in process of  re-
ception both by regional bodies and national tribunals, 
constituting the last frontier where the immunity of  the 
organization can be upheld or waived, wrongfully and 
unilaterally, by national courts. 
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